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Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of 
War 
If the main objective of arms control is to make war less 
likely, then any theory of arms control must rest on a theory of 
the causes of war.1 Most analysts start with the premise that the 
anarchical nature of the international system is crucial: armed 
conflicts occur because no higher authority can prevent them.2 This is 
consistent with the realist tradition, which has dominated American 
thinking since World War II and which informed the thinking of 
those who contributed to the Fall 1960 issue of Dcedalus, even those 
who rejected much of this perspective. The central assumptions are 
that states are the main actors in international affairs, that the 
external environment is more important in determining states' be 
havior than their domestic characteristics, that this behavior was 
conditioned by the absence of an international sovereign, and that in 
this context states must be preoccupied with their own security. 
Although this framework does not specify exactly when and where 
armed conflict will occur, it does give general directions to arms 
control. First, it tells us that we cannot eliminate the possibility of war 
without creating world government. Second, it points to states rather 
than individuals, economic classes, interest groups, bureaucracies, or 
transnational organizations as the sources of conflict and cooperation 
in international politics. Third, it could lead analysts to think about 
which kinds of systems are more war-prone than others. Indeed, 
there has been a great deal of research on whether bipolar or 
multipolar systems are more conducive to war.3 But because this 
factor cannot be altered, arms control analysts were drawn to the 
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ways in which states' security policies can produce wars that are 
inadvertent in the sense that they could have been avoided without 
sacrificing the states' core values. 
It is now almost trivial to note that arms control is made possible 
by the fact that the superpowers have common as well as conflicting 
interests even?or especially?in the military arena and that cooper 
ation and conflict are so closely linked that we can hardly analyze one 
without paying attention to the other. In the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the late 1950s, however, this perspective did not come 
naturally. Memories of McCarthyism were still vivid; the claim that 
the United States had common interests with the Soviet Union could 
be seen as dangerously close to being "soft on Communism"; partly 
because the Soviet Union seemed to be gaining on the West in almost 
all respects, most members of the American elite were preoccupied 
with the task of competing with the Communist adversaries/Indeed, 
while liberals scorned the ideological rhetoric of the Eisenhower 
administration, they criticized it as much for its failure to develop a 
vigorous military posture as for its diplomatic clumsiness. 
In this era, military policy and disarmament were considered quite 
separate, if not antithetical. Most of those who were concerned with 
disarmament believed either that such efforts could only follow a 
general reduction of conflict between the superpowers or, more 
frequently, that disarmament would produce such desired political 
changes. Thus, the linked arguments of the emerging arms control 
community that each superpower should be concerned about the 
other's military posture for reasons of mutual safety as well as for 
competitive advantage, and the view that disarmament and arms 
control were aspects of security policy, not alternatives to it, were 
major intellectual and political contributions. 
ARMS CONTROL POSTULATES 
Thomas Schelling emphasized "the possibility that one can simulta 
neously think seriously and sympathetically about our military 
posture and about collaborating with our enemies to improve it."4 
He and Morton Halperin similarly introduced Strategy and Arms 
Control as follows: "The essential feature of arms control is the 
recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation 
and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their 
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military establishments."5 Note that the claim is not merely that the 
United States and the Soviet Union have some interests in common. 
Even the most hardened cold warriors were willing to see some areas 
where the superpowers could negotiate. But the stronger and less 
obvious argument is that it is in the area of military policy, where 
common sense and much previous discussion had located the highest 
degree of conflict, that the superpowers had major reasons to 
cooperate. In significant measure this argument rested on the broader 
development of deterrence theory and the claim that, in Brodie's 
familiar words: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establish 
ment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be 
to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."6 A shift 
in the way war was viewed opened a space for arms control. 
Measures which were in both sides' military interests were precluded 
as long as people thought that wars were absolute struggles in which 
each side tried only to weaken, thwart, and harm the other and 
believed that the state could best prevent wars by being in the best 
position to defeat the other should war occur. As we will see later, 
many of the criticisms of arms control rest on this conception of 
deterrence. 
By contrast, arms control rests on the theory that wars can occur 
because states have failed to realize the cooperation which their 
interests actually entail. For its centrality as well as its disagreement 
with previous views, the claim that hostile states almost always have 
important interests of military policy in common can be called the 
fundamental postulate of arms control. Although perhaps only one 
side can win a war, both could lose it in the sense of there having been 
at least one if not several outcomes that would have been mutually 
preferred to fighting. I use the word realize in two senses: to 
understand and to put into practice. Because the purpose of arms 
control research was not only academic, the two senses of realize 
were linked: it was hoped that as the intellectual explanation for the 
potential common interest gained plausibility, the superpowers 
would act on their improved understanding. 
Closely related to this theme is the second postulate of arms 
control: arms control and security policy are not opposed to each 
other. "What we have tried to emphasize more than anything else," 
Schelling and Halperin noted in concluding Strategy and Arms 
Control, "is that arms control, if properly conceived, is not necessar 
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ily hostile to, or incompatible with, or an alternative to, a military 
policy properly conceived."7 "There is hardly an objective of arms 
control, that is not equally a continuing urgent objective of national 
military strategy?of our unilateral military plans and policies."8 In 
the context of the 1950s, the idea of common interest between 
scholars concerned with avoiding war and the military was as 
surprising to some as the idea of common interest with the Soviet 
Union was to others. In fact, the two conceptions are linked. For if 
US-Soviet military relations were zero-sum, then it would have been 
difficult to find overlap between arms control and military policy. 
Again, what is central is the conception of war and how it might be 
prevented. To say that there is no conflict between intelligent arms 
control and intelligent unilateral military policy means that there 
must be significant common interest between the two sides, and that 
winning war in the sense of defeating the other's army can no longer 
be the dominant goal. Once one argues that conflict is inhibited 
because both sides realize that to engage in it is to leave them both 
worse off than if they had been more restrained, arms control is 
compatible with good military policy because our conception of what 
makes military policy good has changed. But?and these are trou 
blesome points to which we will return?this claim was not made 
fully explicit, is subject to rebuttal on both theoretical and practical 
grounds, and has been the focus for later arguments, although not 
always couched in these terms. 
CRISIS STABILITY 
Although there are several ways in which arms control might help 
realize Soviet-American common interest and shape the conception 
of proper American military policy, the central contribution of the 
1960 Dcedalus writers was to emphasize the importance of crisis 
stability. Indeed, this has remained the focus of the theory and, to a 
lesser extent, the practice of arms control ever since. The basic idea is 
that even if both sides prefer peace to war, war could result through 
"the reciprocal fear of surprise attack" to use Schelling's well-known 
phrase.9 Thus Schelling and Halperin declare: "The most mischie 
vous character of today's strategic weapons is that they may provide 
an enormous advantage, in the event that war occurs, to the side that 
starts it."10 A first-strike advantage, coupled with the belief that war 
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is very likely, if not inevitable, would make it rational for a state to 
attack even if it was peaceful because the alternative to attacking 
would be seen, not as peace, but as being attacked. Under these 
circumstances, the state's efforts to deter the adversary or protect 
itself in case of war would make war more likely. Observing the 
state's preparations, the adversary would see the danger of war 
increasing and would itself make ready to strike. While it was not 
much mentioned in the early literature, the obvious case which 
seemed to fit this model was the outbreak of World War I, although 
the relevant history is actually quite ambiguous and has been subject 
to fierce dispute. The crucial variables that the arms controllers 
focused on were the relative advantage of first as compared to a 
second strike (that is, the vulnerability of weapons systems and their 
associated apparatus) and the perceived likelihood of war. (We will 
return to a significant omission?the states' expectations about the 
value of a world that stays at peace.) Unlike some causes of war, these 
are 
manipulable by policy and so are particularly appropriate for a 
theory that can lead to actions. 
DOES THE STATE WANT THE ADVERSARY'S FORCES TO BE 
VULNERABLE? 
While it is clear then that the state should seek to keep the peace by 
decreasing the adversary's incentives to attack, should it decrease its 
own incentives to do so? That is?does it want the adversary's forces 
to be invulnerable and therefore its own population to be vulnerable? 
The first arms control postulate certainly implies that this could be 
the case: just because the adversary wants to reduce its vulnerability 
does not mean that this posture would be bad for the state. Indeed, 
the logic of crisis stability implies that the danger of war will be 
reduced if both sides are immune to surprise attack. But the early 
arms control literature rarely declared that the United States would 
be better off if the Soviet strategic forces were difficult to destroy. 
There are three ways in which this argument might be joined that 
derive from different, but not conflicting, ways of analyzing the 
causes of wars. First, one can claim that crisis instability can cause 
wars without asserting that this is the only cause of war, or even the 
most important one. Schelling and Halperin imply pride of place to 
this danger when, in the sentence quoted above, they refer to first 
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strike advantage as "the most mischievous character of today's 
strategic weapons,"11 and the impression of importance is underlined 
by the lengthy discussion of the topic. But this position could only be 
justified by comparing this danger to others, which little arms control 
literature did. Furthermore, it is interesting that Schelling and 
Halperin do not say that the first-strike advantage poses the greatest 
danger of war, but rather that this is the most troublesome aspect "of 
today's strategic weapons." There then may be greater dangers 
arising from sources other than the weapons. The obvious questions 
are what these other dangers might be, whether concentrating on 
crisis stability distracts us from dealing with them and, indeed, 
whether increasing crisis stability, especially by decreasing the vul 
nerability of Soviet strategic forces, magnifies these other dangers. 
These questions can be approached through a second avenue. The 
theory of war that focuses on crisis instability can be seen as a part of 
a more general theory that stresses the security dilemma and the 
spiral model of conflict. The security dilemma arises because many of 
the ways in which states try to increase their security have the 
unintended consequence of decreasing the security of others. The 
spiral model of conflict sees the resulting action-reaction dynamic as 
accelerated by each side's inability to understand the other or to see 
how the other is interpreting its own behavior. These processes 
generate and magnify conflict, leading to unnecessary wars.12 But 
wars can also start through the failure to deter the adversary: if 
threats led to insecurity and war in 1914, the British policy of 
conciliation and of taking full account of the supposed security needs 
of the other side produced war twenty-five years later.13 Deterrence 
theory, in brief, argues that wars are caused by states failing to 
develop the military strength and credible threats necessary to 
dissuade others from challenging the status quo. Furthermore, threats 
are most likely to be believed when the state can carry them out at 
reasonable cost, which in turn is more likely to be the case when the 
state can protect its own population (that is, if the adversary's 
strategic forces are vulnerable). 
Deterrence theory and the spiral model then make very different 
arguments about the relationship between threats and vulnerability 
on the one hand and war on the other. Yet, the community of 
deterrence theorists overlaps very heavily with the community of 
arms controllers. And in some ways, deterrence and arms control are 
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compatible, if not complementary. Both point to the importance of 
credibility and argue that threats and promises must be contingent; 
that is, the state must show the other that it can and will take actions 
the other does not want if and only if the other takes prohibited 
actions. But the two paths to war are quite different and in practice, 
although not in theory, the policy prescriptions often contradict each 
other. Arms control stresses the dangers that arise when reassurances 
and promises?especially the promise not to strike?are either not 
made or are not believed; deterrence stresses the dangers that arise 
when threats are absent or dismissed. Thus, when Schelling writes on 
arms control, he talks of the danger of inadvertent war and the 
necessity for reassurances that show the adversary that the state will 
refrain from attacking if the adversary will. When he writes on 
deterrence, he argues that war can occur if the state appears weak, 
and that it must show that it will not back down in the face of threats. 
NATURE AND INTENTIONS OF THE ADVERSARY 
To go further we need to turn to the third avenue and question of 
whether the state wants the other side's forces to be vulnerable. 
Classic arms control, like classic realism, sees the actors as essentially 
identical; discussions of crisis stability are couched in terms of two 
interchangeable actors. But other theories?those of Kant, Marx, and 
Wilson, for example?see the causes of war as lying within particular 
kinds of states. Far from ignoring domestic characteristics and 
treating all states as identical "billiard balls,"14 these theories assert 
that certain states cause wars by being aggressive. This is implicitly 
true for much deterrence theory. The language there often posits one 
side that is defending the status quo and another that is challenging 
it. The implication is that aggressive states cause wars and the 
problem is how to halt aggression rather than how to cope with 
offense-dominant technology and the security dilemma. 
To see the prime cause of wars as stemming from the aggressive 
tendencies of some states is not automatically to dismiss the danger of 
crisis instability. Even if the adversary is highly aggressive, a mutually 
undesired war could come about through the reciprocal fear of 
surprise attack. To put the point more generally, even if the degree of 
conflict between the two sides is quite high, there is still room for 
some 
cooperation (that is, the first postulate of arms control can still 
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hold). Indeed, even during World War II there were some restraints 
(on bombing cities at the start of the war and on not using poison gas 
throughout), although these may have been abetted by one side or the 
other miscalculating its own interests. Once nuclear weapons come 
on the scene, furthermore, the area of common interests expands 
because both sides need to avoid all-out war. Nevertheless, if one or 
both sides is highly aggressive, the range of applicability of the second 
postulate must be questioned. In many areas, good military policy 
will not be good arms control, and the attempt to render Soviet forces 
vulnerable might be an example. 
The belief that the main cause of war is aggressive states is often 
linked to the claim that aggressiveness is correlated with, if not 
caused by, domestic repression. Although for years dismissed if not 
ridiculed by many arms controllers, this argument receives more than 
a little support from recent events. It is not likely to be an accident 
that unprecedented progress in arms control has occurred at the same 
time that the Soviet system has undergone unprecedented liberaliza 
tion. Obstacles which were enormous when Brezhnev and his prede 
cessors were in power have vanished with the Gorbachev revolution. 
This is not to say that all dangers have passed, or that nothing would 
have been possible without extensive changes within the Soviet 
Union, but it does appear that the success of arms control has been 
driven less by technological breakthroughs, intellectual ingenuity, 
and shifts in the balance of power than by internal changes which 
have affected the entire range of Soviet foreign policies. 
INTERESTS, DOCTRINES, AND STABILITY 
Those who argued that the United States should have extensive 
counterforce capability pointed out that not only can wars start 
through aggression, but also that although avoiding war is the central 
American interest, it is not the only American interest. The most 
obvious other American interest that could be threatened by invul 
nerable Soviet nuclear forces is Western Europe. The United States 
needs to deter against attacks on allies?"extended deterrence." The 
problem arises because of what Glenn Snyder has called the "stabil 
ity-instability paradox."15 If there is great stability at the strategic 
nuclear level, then there is little credibility in either side's threat to 
launch an all-out attack in response to anything other than an 
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unlimited strike against it.16 The straightforward inference is that, in 
Colin Gray's words, "The United States cannot afford the crisis 
stability that precludes first use of strategic nuclear weapons."17 
It seems intuitively obvious that if there is crisis stability, neither 
side can credibly threaten to start an all-out war in response to a 
limited provocation. But this misstates the situation. It would be an 
accurate formulation if levels of violence were hermetically sealed off 
from each other, if undesired escalation were impossible.18 In fact, 
most statesmen realize that whenever violence is set in motion, no 
one can be sure where it will end up. Because events can readily 
escape control, limited responses carry with them some probability 
that the final, although unintended, result will be all-out war. A state 
that begins a confrontation or responds to one invokes what 
Schelling called "the threat that leaves something to chance."19 What 
then brings pressure to bear on the adversary?and on the state as 
well?is less the immediate product of the action than the fear of 
where both states could end up. 
The fact that the limited response would not automatically lead to 
all-out war means that the state can rationally carry it out under 
some circumstances, and that the threat to do so can be credible; the 
fact that the outcome could be mutual suicide means that the pressure 
generated is considerable. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for 
example, both sides feared that the confrontation, although managed 
extremely carefully, could escalate to nuclear war. According to 
Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy's sense of urgency toward the end of the 
crisis was "based on fear, not of Khrushchev's intention, but human 
error, of something going terribly wrong down the line."20 Indeed, 
the incident that convinced the president that the situation was too 
dangerous to be permitted to continue was the shooting down of the 
U-2 over Cuba, which we now know actually represented an instance 
of these mechanisms because it was carried out by a local Soviet 
military officer against the wishes of Moscow.21 
There are two implications for arms control. First, crisis stability 
need not leave allies dangerously exposed to threats. The fact that 
nuclear war could grow out of a conventional one means that even if 
the Soviets believed that they could win the latter, they could be 
deterred by the possibility of the former, whose occurrence would not 
depend on the vulnerability of their forces. Second, effective counter 
force targeting is not necessary for deterrence. Arms controllers can 
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argue for the virtues of mutual invulnerability without arguing 
against an effective military policy; the second arms control postulate 
is not invalidated by the state's need to protect its allies. 
IMPORTANCE OF DOCTRINE 
But if the need for extended deterrence need not disturb arms control, 
military doctrine can. The applicability of the fundamental arms 
control postulate is questionable if American leaders believe that in 
order to be secure, the United States must be able to insure that the 
Soviet Union?or any other adversary?could not gain a military 
lead over the United States in any kind of limited warfare. It can be 
argued that, even if unfortunate, deterrence indeed does impose such 
a 
requirement: if the United States were not able to match Soviet 
military power at all levels, the Soviet Union could be tempted to start 
a limited war. The stability-instability paradox would hold escalation 
in check; advantage at lower levels of violence could be turned into 
meaningful victory in war or coercion in peacetime. This view of 
military affairs is heavily zero-sum. Soviet and American security 
would be incompatible because only one side could have military 
superiority and only that side could be secure. 
At the highest levels of violence, strong counterforce doctrines 
similarly conflict with the possibility, if not the desirability, of crisis 
stability. As long as both sides believe that all-out war would result in 
mutual devastation, first-strike incentives are negligible and crisis 
stability is relatively easy to attain. This is not true, however, if 
decision makers believe that there are real advantages to be gained by 
destroying more of the adversary's strategic forces than the state is 
losing. Because of multiple warheads, and, even more, because of the 
vulnerability of command and control facilities, a first strike will 
almost surely be advantageous in purely counterforce terms. A state 
that is preoccupied with counting surviving warheads, especially 
those with counterforce capability, will have significant incentives to 
strike first. While these incentives would not likely be high enough to 
be a menace in times of calm, they could be sufficient to create 
instability in periods of heightened tension and perceived likelihood 
of war. Theoretically, this need not be true, even if both sides adopted 
counterforce targeting. In principle, weapons and command systems 
could be so invulnerable that attacking would use up more warheads 
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than it would destroy. But it appears that while the vulnerability of 
command and control systems can be reduced, it cannot be elimi 
nated. In practice, then, it is probably true that the only thing worse 
than starting a counterforce war would be having to fight one after 
receiving the first blow. 
To the extent that either or both sides believe that wars are 
only?or even are best?deterred by having a counterforce capability 
superior to that of the adversary, arms control is pointless or even 
dangerous. A status quo power with extensive commitments could 
seek crisis stability only if it had the ability to defend its allies on the 
nonnuclear level. But crisis stability itself would be hard to achieve 
because of the offensive advantage in a counterforce war. By contrast, 
if what deters is the risk of escalation and the threat that leaves 
something to chance, then both arms control postulates have a great 
deal of validity. 
This perspective also reveals the limits of arms control. While both 
sides have an interest in eliminating extreme crisis instability, they 
need to see that there is some chance that events could get out of 
control once violence is employed because this is the main generator 
of caution and the primary means of exerting pressure on the other 
side. Given the complexity of large-scale military organizations and 
the unpredictability of human affairs, it is doubtful that arms control 
could succeed too well and produce arrangements that would drive 
the danger of undesired escalation close to zero. Furthermore, 
decision makers would probably ensure that this does not happen. 
That is, if crisis stability seemed to greatly reduce risks, it would 
permit, if not require, statesmen to take bolder actions during a crisis 
in order to produce the desired level of danger.22 Similarly, if decision 
makers believed confrontations were quite safe, they would feel freer 
to provoke them (that is, to challenge the adversary's important 
interests). If crisis management were seen as easy, there would be less 
pressure on statesmen to try to prevent crises from arising in the first 
place. (It is striking that we have gone more than a quarter of a 
century since the last major superpower crisis?this is longer than the 
main rivals stayed at peace in most of the prenuclear era.) If security 
is linked in part to the danger of inadvertent war, then too much 
stability could make the world safe for coercion and violence. 
Successful arms control is, then, at a certain distant point, self 
limiting. 
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Unless and until this point is reached, however, the fundamental 
and secondary arms control postulates are compatible with the role 
of force and threats with the nuclear age. But this does not mean that 
they meet the greatest dangers of war. The focus on vulnerability and 
first-strike incentives is excessively mechanistic. States start wars for 
political objectives, not because they see an opportunity or fear that 
the other side does. Indeed, it is hard to find even a single war that 
was inadvertent in the sense that, immediately after it started, both 
sides would have preferred to return to peace on the basis of the 
status quo ante. Of course the question is not one of either/or. Crisis 
instability can interact with political conflict, arms controllers never 
suggested that the former in the absence of the latter would yield war. 
They did not worry that British forces were vulnerable to an 
American, or even to a French, attack; but by concentrating on the 
dangers of offensive advantages and assuming rather than examining 
the political context, they may have both exaggerated the danger of 
crisis instability and generated excessive hope that technical arms 
control could bring peace, if not cooperation. There is much validity 
to the old Soviet criticism of American arms control as preoccupied 
with the military causes of war at the expense of considering the 
broader relations between the two countries. If relations remain 
extremely bad, war can occur even if strategic weapons are not 
vulnerable; if relations greatly improve, vulnerabilities will not be a 
major source of danger. 
Wars are caused predominantly by conflicts of political interests. 
Clashing security requirements are not the only and, perhaps, not the 
most important sources of such conflicts. Incompatible desires for 
territory and dominance, hostile nationalisms and other ideologies, 
and assorted calculations that fighting can be of benefit are common 
causes of wars that lie beyond the ameliorative reach of arms control. 
As I noted earlier, crisis instability is an extreme and fast-acting 
example of the security dilemma. When the offense is dominant, 
states cannot make themselves secure without menacing?or even 
attacking?the adversary. But arms control theorists did not build on 
this insight and raise the question of whether American military and 
foreign policy was unnecessarily decreasing Soviet security and 
heightening Soviet-American conflict, probably because they shared 
the prevailing belief that the Soviet Union was driven more by the 
desire to expand than by the fear that the West would attack it. 
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Concentrating on the danger of preemption and immediate desper 
ation, arms control paid less attention to a preventive war which 
could be produced by the perception that the other side is steadily 
eroding the state's security. 
The standard formula for crisis stability focuses on the size of the 
gap between the payoffs for striking first and for striking second. But 
this neglects the expected evaluation of a world in which war does 
not occur, which is irrelevant only when war is judged to be 
completely certain. As long as the state believes that there is a chance 
that war can be avoided, its decisions will be strongly influenced by 
how well it thinks it will do if peace is maintained. Thus, a state 
which is satisfied with the status quo and is optimistic about its future 
prospects will seek to preserve the peace and may refrain from 
striking even in the face of crisis instability. By contrast, a state which 
is highly dissatisfied and/or which believes that its position is likely to 
deteriorate badly if current trends continue can rationally strike even 
when the offense has only a slight advantage.23 Furthermore, one 
side's misguided military policy can contribute to the other's sense of 
threat and belief that its future fate is bleak unless it fights. While the 
fundamental and second arms control postulates still apply, the focus 
on military instability is too narrow, if not misleading. 
When the costs of war are enormous, it is hard to see how one can 
start unless one or both sides believe that war is inevitable and that 
striking first is preferable to striking second. The theory that underlies 
most American arms control thinking then has a large measure of 
validity. But it excludes the broad political considerations which 
usually play such a large role in decisions to fight. Both the danger of 
aggression and the possibility of long-run spirals of hostility and fear 
have been more potent causes of war than has crisis instability. 
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